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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of decision
rule, minority discrepancy from the majority, minority sex, and groupmember sex on the minority's ability to influence group members in a
mock-jury deliberation of a monetary award in a civil negligence case.
The mixed-sex groups deliberated under either a unanimous or
majority decision rule, and were composed of 4 or 5 naive group
members and a confederate (either male or female), who expressed a
minority opinion that was either high or low in discrepancy from other
group members.
The results showed that a minority's influence is related to the
interactive effects of decision rule and minority's discrepancy from
the majority, such that minority influence was greatest under the
combined conditions of a unanimous decision rule and low minoritymajority discrepancy, and least under a non-unanimous decision rule
and low discrepancy. High discrepancy, regardless of decision rule,
was associated with intermediate levels of minority influence.
Although group members were influenced equally by male and
female minorities, group members of both sexes perceived the female
minority as less influential than the male minority.
Implications for the legal and social influence literatures are
discussed.

ACTIVE MINORITIES AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Social influence has been a widely studied phenomenon in social
psychology.

Beginning with Sherif's (1936) study of autokinetic

effects and Asch's (1951) experiments with line-length estimation, the
study of social influence has dealt primarily with a group's ability
to induce an individual to conform.

Less attention has been paid to

minorities who resist the influence of the group and try to induce the
majority to accept their position (Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972; Nemeth,
1977).

Asch (1956) pointed out that it is incorrect to assume that

social influence is completely explained by a theory of conformity to
group norms.
This paper presents an overview of the minority influence
literature, and then discusses some issues that have not been fully
examined in this area.

The primary focus is on factors affecting

minority influence in jury deliberations.

Within the last 30 years

many states have passed legislation allowing for majority decision
rules in jury deliberations instead of the traditional unanimous rule.
Concern has been expressed for the effect of majority decision rules
on the quality of jury deliberations, especially in situations where a
minority of jurors believe the defendant to be innocent.

This paper

addresses the issue of the effect of decision rule on the minority's
ability to influence other group members.
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Secondly, this study addresses the effect of the extremeness of
the minority's position on their ability to influence the majority,
and whether the decision rule interacts with the minority's
discrepancy from the majority to affect differentially the majority’s
reaction to the minority.

Finally, the implications of the minority

influence person's sex, as well as the sex of the target, are
discussed.

Although sex differences in influenceability and

persuasibility have been studied extensively in other social influence
frameworks, this topic has not received much attention in the minority
influence literature.
Majority Influence
Without question, majorities exert powerful influences, as shown
by an early study by Sherif (1936).

Subjects made perceptual

judgments privately, then publicly, and then again privately.
Subjects converged their judgments of the autokinetic effect during
the public trials to form a group norm, and maintained this norm
during the second phase of private judgments.

Sherif's findings

indicated that in an ambiguous situation people will publicly comply
with the group norm, and also internalize that norm.
Asch (1951) had individual male subjects, in the presence of
confederates who gave incorrect answers, state their choices for which
of three lines was equal in length to a standard line.

Thirty-three

percent of the subjects conformed to the majority judgment on at least
half of the critical trials. Further, almost 75 percent of the
subjects gave the group's answer on at least one trial.
and Zander (1968) noted:

Cartwright
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In this experiment the critical subject is
unacquainted with the other participants and ...
they make no overt effort to influence his
behavior.

His judgments, moreover, concern matters

having little intrinsic importance to him, to his
future relations with the others, and to the fate
of those in the room.

Nevertheless, there are

clearly strong pressures on him to conform.

One

would surely expect these pressures to be even
stronger in more natural settings and with respect
to matters having greater significance for the
participants, (pp. 139-140)

Schachter (1951) found that majorities exerted strong pressure by
initially increasing communication to the deviate and then following
with rejection if the deviate did not yield.

Until recently, anyone

reviewing the literature would have had to conclude that there existed
only two courses open to a minority:

conformity to the group norm or

rejection by the group.
Majority Influence: A Different Interpretation
As noted by several researchers (e.g., Moscovici, 1985; Moscovici
& Faucheux, 1972; Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974), minorities exert
influence.

In contrast to the influence of the majority are

innovations in such fields as politics, science, business, and art,
usually originating and succeeding through the determined efforts of
minorities.

Moscovici and Faucheux (1972) interpreted some of the

classic conformity research from the perspective of the minority's
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influence on group opinion.

Findings from the Asch (1951) procedure

are often attributed to the naive subject's acceptance of the majority
judgment as defining social reality.

Moscovici and Faucheux (1972)

pointed out, however, that subjects already have a general norm of
perceptual judgment that has developed prior to their participation in
a laboratory experiment; that is, their experience in the world has
already defined social and physical reality for them before they enter
the experimental situation.

In the Asch procedure, subjects are

confronted with confederates who adhere to a different norm--a norm
that is a minority norm in the eyes of the subject.

Following this

approach, Moscovici and Faucheux (1972) suggested that the group of
confederates really constitute a minority that is able to influence a
majority member.

They compared the naive subjects' situation to that

of a captive audience (e.g., prisoners of war) and concluded that "the
Asch experiments show that a consistent minority can modify, under
certain circumstances, the predominant norm" (p. 153).
According to Moscovici and Faucheux (1972), the same type of
reasoning can be applied to the Jacobs and Campbell (1961) study that
used the autokinetic effect to study the transmission of norms in
groups of four.

Subjects made public judgments for 30 trials, and

then one experienced subject was replaced by a naive subject.

In the

experimental condition, the initial group consisted of three
confederates, who gave extreme judgments, and one naive subject.

At

the end of the first block of 30 trials, a confederate was replaced
with a naive subject.

This replacement continued every 30 trials, so

that all confederates were eventually withdrawn and replaced by naive
subjects.

The transmission of the arbitrary norm to replacement
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subjects continued through the seventh block of 30 trials.

That is,

even though the members of the original experimental group had all
been replaced by the fourth block of trials, the judgments of
replacement members continued to be more extreme than those of control
subjects until the seventh trial block.

Moscovici and Faucheux

pointed out that the norm transmitted through several subject
generations was found to decrease in extremity as each replacement
subject joined the group until the group's norm was not significantly
different from that of the control group.

So it is possible to

consider each naive subject as exerting a minority influence on the
group's j udgments.
The tendency to focus on the minority's conformity to the
majority, the conformity bias (Nemeth, 1977), is apparent even in
definitions of social influence and related concepts such as public
compliance and private acceptance.

Deutsch and Gerard (1955) have

referred to social pressure that results in public compliance as
"normative social influence".

In this situation, the group is able to

obtain compliance by exerting norms and by using sanctions against
nonconformers.

"Informational social influence" refers to the type of

social influence that leads to private acceptance by supplying the
individual with information relevant to the issue.

Social sanctions

are not necessary as the information itself is sufficient to produce
the desired change.
by the majority.

In both cases, the minority is being influenced

As Nemeth (1977) pointed out, the majority's basis

for influence is the minority's dependence on the majority for
approval (normative influence) and information about social reality
(informational influence).

A minority, on the other hand, clearly
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lacks the numbers to Impose either type of influence, leaving other
factors to be explored for their contribution to the influence of a
minority.
Basis of Minority Influence:

Behavioral Style

Moscovici and Nemeth (1974) hypothesized that the behavioral
style of the minority, facilitated by the attention focused toward the
minority, is responsible for the minority influence found in their,
and their associates', research (e.g., Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972;
Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969; Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974;
Nemeth, Swedlund, & Kanki, 1974; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983).
Specifically, behavioral consistency over time seems to be critical to
minority influence (Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969), with
consistent patterning, rather than rigid consistency, being a more
effective strategy (Nemeth, Swedlund, & Kanki, 1974).

The minority's

consistency should follow a pattern that agrees with variations in the
situation and not maintain a rigid position.

This flexibility creates

an impression of confidence and certainty, while minimizing the
ability of the group to reject the minority on the basis of
idiosyncratic behavior.

Rejection of an individual deviate is the

initial response of most group members, as demonstrated in an early
Asch (1952) study.

An individual confederate who made inaccurate

judgments in the presence of 16 naive subjects was laughed at or
ignored, whereas two confederates who gave inaccurate responses were
not laughed at, and Asch (1952) reported that they were taken much
more seriously.
The importance of consistency over time to minority influence was
examined by Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux (1969).

Subjects made
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judgments about the color and brightness of slides, prepared so that
the intensity of the light passing through the slide varied but was
always within the blue wavelength scale.

In one condition, two

confederates reported that they saw green on each of the 36 trials.
In the other condition the two confederates randomly (but always
agreeing with each other) called the stimulus "green" on two-thirds of
the trials and "blue" on the remaining trials.

Naive subjects in the

consistent condition called the stimulus "green" 8.42 percent of the
time, which was significantly different from subjects in the control
condition who considered the stimulus green only 0.25 percent of the
time.

In the inconsistent condition, naive subjects reported "green"

only 1.25 percent of the time and were not significantly different
from the control subjects.

The minority exerted influence only when

it was consistent over time.
The second part of this study also provided evidence for minority
influence.

Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux (1969) believed that the

subjects might maintain the majority position even though influenced
by the minority, and they wanted to see whether the subjects exposed
to the consistent minority would show signs of this influence in a
subsequent blue-green designation threshold task.

Subjects were shown

16 discs, 3 of which were unambiguously blue, 3 unambiguously green
and 10 which might have appeared ambiguous.

Thirty-seven of the 40

subjects called the blue stimuli "green" more often than the control
subjects, indicating a modification in their judgments that was
consistent with the position of the minority in the first part of the
study.
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In another study, Moscovici and Faucheux (1972) had subjects in
groups of four or five publicly state and privately record their
preferences for either the size, color, shape or line variations in a
series of drawings.

In the experimental group, a confederate

consistently gave "color" as his answer.

Color was chosen

significantly more often in the experimental group than in the control
group.

The consistent behavior of the minority was credited with

producing this effect.
In a later experiment, the salience of the minority’s
consistency was increased by having an assistant record each person's
responses on a large board.

Moscovici and Faucheaux (1972) made the

following assumptions about this procedure:

(1) subjects could see

which people were answering the same as others; (2) subjects were in
the position of making highly public commitment; (3) subjects could
see that the minority person was never influenced by anyone else, and;
(4) the consistent behavior of the minority appeared unrelated to
reality.

Comparison of the first half of 64 trials with the second

half showed a significant decrease in responses of "color", indicating
rejection of the minority.

The researchers pointed out that Cohen

(1963) found extreme majority answers in the Asch paradigm yielded
greater conformity in the earlier trials with a gradual shift to the
more accurate answers.
phenomenon:

So there seems to be a limit to the influence

Individuals (or groups) cease to be influential when

their position clearly appears unrelated to reality.
Nemeth, Swedlund, and Kanki (1974) posited that the perception of
realistic consistency on the part of the minority could be maintained
through consistent patterning of responses.

They hypothesized that
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the majority's perception that the minority has a firmly-held position
is necessary for minority influence, and further, that the minority's
position will still be seen as consistent when it modifies its
position in response to changes in the situation or stimulus.

The

experiment which tested this hypothesis used a paradigm very much like
the one used by Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969).

Each

experimental group consisted of two confederates and four naive
subjects.

The slides were blue, but varied in brightness.

In one

experimental condition, the confederates said they saw the color as
"green'* on 50% of the trials, and "green-blue" on the other trials in
a predetermined random order (random condition).
correlated conditions were used:

Two brightness-color

In one, the confederates assigned

"green-blue" to 14 slides that were brightest and "green" to the 14
least bright slides, and in the other condition "green-blue" was
assigned to the least bright slides and "green" to the brightest.

Two

straight repetition conditions were included in which the confederates
consistently said "green" on each trial (straight green condition), or
"green-blue" on every trial (straight green-blue condition).
The two brightness-color correlated conditions yielded the
greatest amount of minority influence and were significantly more
effective than the random and straight green conditions (although the
correlated conditions were not significantly different from the
straight green-blue condition).

The confederates in the brightness-

color correlated conditions were considered more organized, more
trusted, and more confident in their judgments.

Nemeth et al

concluded that the patterning of the confederate judgments and the
perceptions produced by such patterns may be the foundation for
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minority influence.

Even though there was variation in the minority's

position, they were at least as effective as the consistent green-blue
confederates.

The variations in the minority's position were tied to

reality by being correlated with changes in brightness of the slides.
Recently researchers have attempted to integrate
conceptualizations of minority and majority influence.

Latane (1981;

Latand & Wolf, 1981) suggested that social impact (either minority or
majority influence) is a multiplicative function of the strength
(e.g., status, power, and knowledge), immediacy (proximity in space
and time), and number of group members (such that the first person has
the strongest impact, with each additional person having a marginally
decreasing impact). As discussed by Maass and Clark (1984), social
impact theory's implications for minority influence is twofold:

(1)

The first minority member will have the greatest influence, with each
additional minority member having marginally less impact; and (2)
there is no basic difference between the underlying mechanisms of
minority and majority influence.

The majority, then, will usually

exert greater influence due to its greater number.

A minority can

only overcome this effect by greater consistency (equated with
"strength" in this model).
Tanford and Penrod (1984) have refined Latane's model, but still
suggest that "influence is predominantly a function of the number of
targets and sources of influence," with "the consistency of the
influence source ... also an important predictor of influence" (p.
189).

Thus, recent theoretical work has sought to explain why

majority influence is more common than minority influence.
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In summary, although a majority is predisposed to reject the
deviate, under certain conditions (e.g., when the minority maintains a
confident, realistic, and consistent position) minority influence
occurs.

The main purpose of this paper was to define further the

effects of decision rule and the minority's discrepancy from the group
on the minority's ability to influence the majority in a mock-jury
deliberation.
Effect of Decision Rule and Minority Discrepancy
Decision rule.

The emphasis of previous minority influence

research has been on perceptual judgments.

The effect of a minority

in group decision-making on social or opinion topics has not been
examined thoroughly.

Minority influence processes are particularly

salient in jury deliberations, and are assumed by Supreme Court
Justices (Johnson v . Louisiana. 1972) to ensure that final verdicts
are just.

Historically, juries in the United States have been

required to reach unanimous decisions, but within the last 30 years
the trend has been to allow majority rule, where a verdict can be
decided by a 10 to 2, or even a 9 to 3, vote.

Nemeth (1981) pointed

out the importance of examining the effects of jury decision rules
(i.e., unanimity versus majority) on minorities' influence of
majorities' decisions to convict or to acquit defendants.
There are several aspects to this issue.

First, there is concern

that a majority will not consider the arguments of a minority whose
votes are not needed for conviction, that is, where the majority is
large enough to satisfy the decision rule.

Although Kalven and Zeisel

(1966) found that 5.6% of cases result in hung juries (i.e.,
nonunanimous verdicts) under unanimity requirements, Saks and Hastie
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(1978) found that 25% of verdicts are not reached by consensus in
those states that allow for nonunanimous decisions.

Nemeth (1977)

found that mock-juries didn't stop deliberating when a 2/3 majority
rule was met, but that they did not continue until full consensus was
reached.

Further, the 2/3 majority rule groups stopped significantly

short of consensus compared to groups under a unanimity decision rule.
The Nemeth (1977) and Saks and Hastie (1978) findings support the idea
that a majority may be more likely to disregard a minority's arguments
when a group is not required to reach a unanimous decision.
A second issue concerns the effects of decision rules on the
nature of the deliberation process and the possibility that discussion
under a unanimity rule might be more robust than under majority rule.
Nemeth (1977) found that unanimity groups not only required more
deliberation time compared to majority groups, but also gave more
information and opinions during the discussion.

Unanimity group

members reported experiencing more conflict than did majority-rule
group members.

This is of particular note in light of the Supreme

Court's assumption (e.g., Apodaca. Cooper and Madden v. Oregon. 1972;
Johnson v. Louisiana. 1972) that a majority would not stop discussion
and outvote a minority as long as the minority had persuasive reasons
to support their arguments.

(Nemeth (1981) noted the irony of that

assumption, given that the Court was split 5 to 4 in those decisions.
The minority Justices obviously felt that they had persuasive reasons
to argue against majority decision rules, which they expressed in
dissenting opinions.)
A third concern is the effects of decision rules on how confident
society is that justice has been done.

The concern here is that
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justice must not only be preserved, but the perception of justice must
be protected as well.

In this sense, a majority decision rule would

be considered harmful if it eroded public confidence in the judicial
system, even if empirical data showed that no differences were found
between decision rules.

To exemplify the potential for negative

social perceptions of a majority decision rule, Nemeth (1981) used the
hypothetical example of a 9 to 3 split on convicting a black
defendant, where the majority jurors were white and the dissenting
jurors were black.
Confidence and satisfaction with the group decision can vary with
decision rule even for the decision makers (Kerr, Atkin, Stasser,
Meek, Holt, & Davis, 1976; Nemeth, 1977).

Unanimity group members

believe that justice is better served than those who deliberate under
a majority decision rule.

Minorities in the 2/3 majority rule groups

are the most dissatisfied.

Although it is not clear whether this

effect can be generalized to the community, it is still of importance
that those who participate as decision makers in the judicial system
believe that the process is fair.
One explanation for the differences between unanimity and
majority decision rules is that decision rule may affect group
interdependence.

Unanimity decision rule groups may be more likely to

perceive themselves as working towards a goal than groups who are not
required to reach unanimity.

Studies on interdependence of groups and

majority influence have usually found that interdependent groups are
more conforming than independent ones.

Deutsch and Gerard (1955) told

subjects in an interdependent condition that the five groups which
made the fewest errors would receive a valued reward.

More
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conformity was found in the interdependent groups than in the
independent groups.

This effect was so strong, in fact, that the

subjects were conforming to the incorrect judgments of confederates,
even though winning was contingent on being one of the five most
accurate groups.
Much of the controversy on decision rules has focused on their
effect on verdicts in murder and rape cases (e.g., Nemeth, 1977).
Considerably less attention has been paid to the effect of decision
rule on the outcome of civil cases.

It is not known to what extent

findings from cases where a defendant stands to lose either life or
liberty can be generalized to cases where the jury is asked to assess
liability or to make monetary awards.

This issue is important for a

society whose court system is unable to meet the increasing demands
placed upon it.

If it could be demonstrated that there was no

difference in outcome due to decision rule, and outcomes could be
reached more quickly (and therefore less expensively) by a majority
rule, then one solution to the over-crowded court system could be to
allow majority decision rule for civil cases, reserving the more
costly unanimity rule for criminal cases.

On the other hand, such an

innovation would be inadvisable if it were found that the perception
of justice was negatively affected by use of a majority rule.

To

date, the implications of different decision rules for civil cases
have not been addressed.
The present study involved a mock-jury deliberation of a civil
negligence case, where the jurors were required to determine a
monetary award.

This decision task, originated by Nemeth and Wachtler

(1974), has also been used by Arbuthnot and Wayner (1982), and Wolf
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(1985).

None of these studies addressed the issue of decision rule.

Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) used a unanimity rule for all experimental
conditions, and found that the minority individual was successful in
influencing the majority only when he chose the head seat at the
deliberation table (as opposed to being assigned to it, or sitting in
a side seat).

Nemeth and Wachtler believed that the limited minority

influence was due to the extremity of the minority's opinion
(discussed in more detail below).

The case was chosen for this study

for its suitability as a civil case where the decision rule could be
manipulated easily, and for the potential to generalize to other
studies which have used the same case.

The latter reason seemed

particularly compelling in an area where so little research has been
published.

The mock-juries were composed of a minority individual

(who was a confederate) and a majority of four or five naive subjects.
Following from Nemeth's (1977) findings, it was expected that a
minority would be more influential under a unanimity decision rule
than under a majority decision rule.

Under majority rule group

members would be less motivated to listen to the minority's arguments
when it was possible for them to reach an acceptable verdict without
the minority's approval.
Further, it was expected that the majority group members would be
more satisfied with the group discussion under a unanimous decision
rule than under a non-unanimous decision rule.

This was expected even

though the minority (confederate) would not conform to the group's
position, and would probably result in the group being unable to reach
a unanimous decision in the time allowed.

Kerr et al (1976) and
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Nemeth (1977) found that unanimity group members had a stronger sense
of serving justice than did majority decision rule group members.
Discrepancy from the group.

The effect of extremity of position

on influence has not been clearly established.

Tudderiham (1961) found

that increased discrepancy between false group consensus and control
group consensus produced increased conformity.

In contrast,

Whittacker (1964) found a curvilinear relationship in an autokinetic
effect study.

Moderately discrepant norms produced more change than

those that were largely or slightly discrepant.

Inconsistent results

have been found by other research involving norm extremity and
objective stimuli (e.g., Asch, 1956; Olmstead & Blake, 1955; Schroder
& Hunt, 1958).

Goldberg (1954) suggested that subjects working with

objective stimuli begin to suspect the experimental procedure when the
norm is too extreme.
Objective reality is not as clear-cut when dealing with opinion
issues, however.

Helson, Blake, and Mouton (1958) found that

conformity on opinion items increased with extremeness of the norm and
then reached a plateau, a finding inconsistent with research on
minority influence which has shown that the group prefers to reject
the deviate when possible (e.g., Asch, 1952; Moscovici & Faucheax,
1972; Nemeth, Swedlund, & Kanki, 1974; Schachter, 1951).

Groups might

dismiss individuals who take extreme positions if they can interpret
their actions as being due to some idiosyncratic difference, such as
being generally unreasonable.
A study by Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) is relevant.

They found

that an individual only exerted influence when he chose to sit in the
head seat; confederates who were assigned to the head seat, or who
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either chose or were assigned to a side seat, exerted no minority
influence.

They interpreted their results as indicating that the

majority perceived the confederate who chose the head seat as very
confident, and this led to the ability to influence the group.

The

lack of any minority influence in the other conditions was surprising,
however, considering the findings from other studies.

Nemeth and

Wachtler suggested that minority influence might have occurred in all
conditions if the minority position had been less extreme.

This seems

likely, given the emotional nature of the experimental discussion
sessions, as reported by Nemeth and Wachtler.

Since the present study

used the same case, this point will be elaborated.
Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) noted that the naive subjects were
very committed to their position.

The groups' task was to reach an

unanimous decision on how much money to award a washing machine
repairman who broke his leg at a customer's home due to the customer's
negligence.

His insurance had reimbursed him for wage losses and

hospitalization, but he was suing for "the past and present pain and
suffering and the worry and grief which he has undergone as a result
of this accident."

The average initial judgment by the subjects was

$14,670, with no one giving less than $8,000.

The confederate’s

position was that the repairman should only get $3,000.
Wachtler reported thatsubjects were abusive to

Nemeth and

the confederates, even

to the point where one

subject offered to break the confederate's leg

after the session " to

demonstrate thepain and suffering of such an

injury" (p. 69).

Thus, unlike subjects in other studies who were

asked to identify color slides, subjects in this experiment were
vehement in maintaining their positions.

It is noteworthy that the
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minority exerted influence in any condition, considering how much the
group members disliked the confederate.
Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) suggested that minority influence
might have occurred (in varying degrees) in all the experimental
conditions if the minority position had been less extreme, i.e., if
the confederate had chosen an amount closer to the majority's
position.

Given the inconclusive nature of the research that exists

on this topic, an examination of the effect of position extremity on
minority influence is needed.
Based on previous research, it was expected that minorities who
expressed an opinion highly discrepant from the group would be less
influential than those minorities whose opinions were closer to the
group norm.

Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) believed that in the case used

in the present study, the small minority influence effect which they
found was due to the extremity of the minority's position.

Further,

majorities are more likely to reject a deviant minority when the
minority is highly discrepant from the group norm.

It was expected

that minorities who expressed an opinion highly discrepant from the
group norm would be judged more negatively by the group than those
whose opinions were closer to the group norm.
Sex Differences
Sex differences in exerting influence. A review by Eagly (1978)
of the persuasion research (i.e., where individuals stated their
positions and provided supporting arguments) and conformity research
(i.e., where the opinion of a source person is given without
supporting arguments) indicates that the existing literature on sex
differences in exerting influence shows a very inconsistent pattern.
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Although many of the studies found no effect of communicator sex
(e.g., Johnson & MacDonnell, 1974; Meyers & Arenson, 1968; Miller &
McReynolds, 1973), other studies found sex differences in direct
conflict with other published studies.

For instance, Knower (1935)

found that cross-sex combinations of influencing agent and target led
to greater opinion change, whereas Crano (1970) found that same-sex
combinations were more effective.

Meade and Barnard (1973, 1975)

found that males were more effective with both male and female
targets, whereas Luchins (1955) found that females were more effective
than males with male targets.

Finally, Sistrunk and McDavid (1971)

reported that females were more effective with female targets on
masculine items, in contrast to Goldberg's (1975) finding that males
were more influential on masculine items.
Eagly (1978) suggested that these conflicting results should be
considered in light of the target's goals.

Following from Deutsch and

Gerard's (1955) distinction between informational and normative
influence, Eagly suggested that targets who are primarily concerned
with getting valid information may be more likely to be influenced by
a male, given that males are generally perceived to be more competent
than females.

When the target's goal is more interpersonal, the

relationship between the sex of the target and communicator will
depend on the specific goal.

For instance, when learning role-

specific behavior is the goal, same-sex combinations may lead to
greater influence, whereas when sexual attraction is seen as the
salient goal, cross-sex combinations might lead to greater influence.
Eagly (1978) also noted that when normative pressures are salient
(presumably when they outweigh the need for informational validity),
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sex stereotypical behavior may occur.

Studies in which there is high

normative pressures in mixed-sex groups might show greater public
compliance on the part of males in response to a female versus male
communicator (i.e., following the norm of chivalry), whereas females
who follow the norm of deferring to male authority might show more
public compliance to males than to females.

Hence, Eagly

distinguished between the public and private influence that one might
expect from informational influence.
In a later analysis of sex differences in social influence, Eagly
(1983) suggested that laboratory findings of greater influence by men
(and greater influenceability of women) were due to males' higher
social status, even when status was controlled within the experimental
setting.

Eagly (1983) hypothesized that individuals have implicit

theories of influence based on stereotypic sex differences that men
are dominant and women are submissive (Eagly & Wood, 1982).

Eagly

(1983) argued that although subjects believe that men and women have
equal influence when they have equal status (as when the equality of
status was explicitly stated in Eagly and Wood, 1982), individuals in
real organizations and groups have little opportunity to observe such
equal status situations.

The stereotypic implicit theory of influence

therefore, remains unchallenged, and unaltered, by everyday
experience, leading people to behave in ways that confirm their
expectations (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Berger, Fisek, Norman,
& Zelditch, 1977; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Meeker &
Weitzel-O'Neill, 1977).

This argument was supported by group-

interaction studies that show an overall tendency for males to exert
more influence than females (Brown, 1979), whereas the persuasion and
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conformity studies (where there is no group interaction) show no
consistent male superiority in exerting influence (Eagly, 1978, 1983).
Two mock-jury studies by Nemeth, Endicott, and Wachtler (1976)
examined the nature of interaction during the deliberations, and
potential sex differences in verdicts, persuasibility, and
participants' perceptions of the deliberations.

No differences were

found in either study between the sexes on verdict and influence
exerted.

In the first study, in which evidence was made available in

written form, male jurors offered more information, opinions, and
suggestions than female jurors.

Males were more likely to take the

head seat during deliberation and were the target of more
communications than females.
In the second study, jurors witnessed a two hour trial rather
than receiving the evidence in written form.

None of the sex

differences found in study #1 were found in study #2.

Nemeth et al

suggested that jurors who witness a trial and do not have a written
account of the evidence may be more likely to accept and offer
information to recollect the facts of the case.

Nemeth et al also

proposed that jurors are more committed after witnessing a two-hour
trial, and are less reticent about expressing their views.

An

important finding was that males in both studies were perceived as
more influential, rational, independent, confident, strong,
aggressive, and as more of a leader than were females, in spite of the
lack of differences between the sexes (in the second study) on
verdict, participation, style, or actual effectiveness.

The authors

concluded that their findings do not support the lawyers' folklore
that women are more persuadable, submissive, dependent, and passive,
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but show that male and female participants perceive women as more
persuadable, dependent, passive, and non-influential.
Nemeth, Endicott, and Wachtlerfs (1976) study supports the notion
of an implicit theory of stereotypic influence, but it is interesting
that there was no sex difference for the actual influence of
participants.

Perhaps in a jury deliberation (even a mock one) the

need for valid information in part dissipates the normative influence
pressures, so that males and females are considered equal sources of
input.

Of course, the perception that men are more influential, even

when they are not, points to the pervasiveness of the stereotypic
norms.
What are the implications of these findings for minority
influence, especially when the minority is a single individual who is
trying to exert influence?

This has been a largely overlooked issue

in the minority influence literature.

Most of the studies have used

perceptual tasks, where there was no group interaction, and where the
subjects and confederates were all males (e.g., Nemeth, Swedlund, &
Kanki, 1974; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983) or all females (e.g., Nemeth,
Wachtler, & Endicott, 1977).

None of the previously cited studies by

Moscovici or Nemeth compared the effectiveness of males and females.
Three published studies have usedisthe decision task (a mock-jury
deliberation to determine the amount of award in a civil negligence
case) that was employed in the present study (Arbuthnot & Wayner,
1982; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974; Wolf, 1985).

Of these, one used only

males (Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974), and one only females (Wolf, 1985, a
simulated, not face-to-face, discussion).

Only Arbuthnot and Wayner

(1982) investigated the effect of sex of the minority source person.
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They found that there was no difference between the amount of
influence exerted by male and female minorities.

However, Arbuthnot

and Wayner reported that female minority confederates who chose to sit
at the head of the table (which had previously been found by Nemeth &
Wachtler, 1974, to increase male confederates' influence) were
considered more active (active-passive, progressive-regressive, calmexcitable, stable-changeable) and more potent (hard-soft, cautiousrash, strong-weak, severe-lenient) than were the males in the same
condition.

The authors suggested that female minorities, unlike male

minorities, violated traditional sex role norms, and therefore they
were perceived as more potent and active because their behavior was
discrepant from the majority's expectations.
Arbuthnot and Wayner reported that the female minority
confederates were not liked less (or more) than males, in spite of
their non-traditional behavior, and concluded that women in real-life
problem-solving group situations should not be afraid to assume an
active role, but that they should not expect to exert more influence
in proportion to their more active role (as compared to men).
Arbuthnot and Wayner noted that "apparently, as is unfortunately
typical in such situations, the female needs to exhibit more of a
given attribute that the male in order to achieve the same outcome"
(p. 293).

Certainly that sentiment is supported by their findings

that in the control condition (that is, where no minority influence
attempts were made by confederates), women at the head of the table
were perceived as less able to lead the group and as having guided the
discussion less than males in the same condition.

Arbuthnot and

Wayner suggested that only the more assertive women (i.e., the female
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confederates who supported a minority opinion) were able to overcome
the stereotypic, negative evaluation.

The findings from this study

are certainly provocative, but since it is the only study of its type,
replication is warranted.

Further, the authors did not examine the

relative persuasibility of the male and female subjects.
Sex differences in influenceability.

Considerably more research

has been done on sex differences in persuasibility than on sex
differences in exerting influence.

In general, this research has

found that women are more persuasible than men, although the effect
size is generally small, and women are more conforming than men in
group pressure situations, especially when under the surveillance of
the influence source (Cooper, 1979; Eagly, 1983; Eagly & Carli, 1981).
In a review of 47 studies published between 1958 and 1974,
Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) concluded that although there were
inconsistent findings of sex differences in influenceability, the
overall tendency was for no difference, except that women tend to be
more conforming in face-to-face situations which require open
disagreement with others (i.e., as in the Asch design).
Eagly (1978) supported these conclusions in her more extensive
review of the literature on persuasion and conformity.

Of the 62

persuasion studies reviewed, Eagly found that 51 (82%) showed no sex
difference, with only 10 (16%) reporting significant greater female
persuasibility.

In 22 conformity studies not involving group

pressure, 86% showed no difference, and 9% showed greater female
conformity.

In 61 studies of group pressure conformity, 62% found no

difference, and 34% reported significantly greater conformity among
females.

Eagly concluded that the usual finding was for no
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difference, but that a substantial minority of studies demonstrated
greater female conformity in group pressure situations.

She suggested

that this latter trend reflected women's desire to promote harmony and
positive social relationships in group settings, rather than any real
change in their private opinions.
Two meta-analyses have been performed on sex differences in
influenceability.

Cooper (1979) analyzed 38 of the 47 studies

reviewed earlier by Maccoby and Jacklin (1974).

Unlike previous

reviewers, Cooper concluded that there was sufficient evidence to
indicate greater conformity of women, with 89 uncovered studies being
needed to reverse that conclusion.

Cooper (1979) agreed with Maccoby

and Jacklin that women conform more than males in face-to-face
settings, but disagreed by concluding that there was consistency in
these findings.

Finally, Cooper agreed with Maccoby and Jacklin that

the reviewed studies of persuasion experiments and conformity
experiments using fictitious group norms showed no differences.
In a more recent meta-analysis, Eagly and Carli (1981) criticized
Cooper's (1979) sample by pointing out that his conclusion that women
are more conforming than men was based on retrieved quantitative
information from only 18 studies, and the null findings for persuasion
studies and studies using fictitious group norms were based on
retrieved data from 2 and 4 studies, respectively.

Eagly and Carli's

(1981) meta-analysis was conducted on 61 persuasion studies, 64
conformity studies involving group pressure, and 23 conformity studies
not involving group pressure.

The studies all had subjects of high

school age or older, and appeared in psychology journals between 1949
and 1977.

The results showed an overall tendency, in all three
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categories, for women to be more conforming than men.

When analyzed

by year of publication, however, it was found that earlier studies
were more likely to find greater female influenceability, supporting
Eagly's (1978) earlier suggestion that social changes were modifying
this tendency.

The authors also examined the magnitude of the sex

difference, and found the mean effect to be between .16 (which was the
value obtained by including studies assumed to have no sex effect) and
.26 (found by including only studies which gave effect size
estimates).

Eagly and Carli (1981) pointed out that Cohen (1977)

suggested that .20 indicates a small effect and .50 a medium effect,
so they interpreted the entire sample as demonstrating a small sex
difference in influenceability.
Eagly and Carli (1981) also contrasted the mean effect size of
group pressure experiments with persuasion studies and other
conformity studies not involving group pressure, in order to determine
support for the previously suggested (Cooper, 1979; Eagly, 1978;
Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974) tendency for women to be more conforming in
that situation.

They found that the group pressure mean effect size

was larger than that for the persuasion studies, but not for other
types of conformity studies.

However, the authors considered those

findings only suggestive, in part due to the low sample size of the
non-group pressure studies.

Later work by Eagly (1983; Eagly, Wood, &

Fishbaugh, 1981) supported the notion that women are more conforming
than men in mixed-sex group pressure situations which involve
surveillance by the influencing agent.
In summary, then, in the traditional majority-influence
literature a consistent, but small, effect for greater conformity of
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women is found, especially in group pressure situations where the
subjects are observed by the influence source.
What has not been addressed is whether or not there is a sex
difference in influenceability in the minority influence paradigm.
That is, will women be somewhat more influenced than men by a minority
source?

Perhaps of even greater interest is the question of a

possible interaction between sex of minority and sex of group member.
Eagly (1978) suggested that men, following the norm of chivalry, might
publicly agree with a woman, and that women, following the norm of
deferring to a man, might publicly agree with a man.

The underlying

basis for this supposition (i.e., public adherence to social norms)
leaves the possibility that the expressed public opinions might be
different from private opinions.
In contrast, it has also been suggested that male sources have
more credibility (Eagly, 1978).

This suggests that a male minority

would have more influence with male and female group members alike.
Since this second suggestion is based on the concept of informational
influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), there should be no differences in
public and private opinions.

Although Arbuthnot and Wayner (1982)

examined the effect of male and female minorities (as discussed in the
previous section on sex differences in influenceability), they did not
report on any sex differences in influenceability, nor did they
consider any interaction effects.

Clearly such an examination is

needed.
Previous research suggests that there should be no sex effects
for influence of the minority person.

Although the literature shows

support for an overall tendency for males to be more influential than
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females, previous research using mock jury deliberations (i.e.,
Nemeth, Endicott, & Wachtler, 1976; Arbuthnot & Wayner, 1982) found no
differences for males and females in amount of influence exerted.
This lack of a sex effect may be due to informational needs, rather
than normative concerns, being more salient in a mock jury discussion.
Further, previous research suggests that female minorities are
considered less influential than male minorities.

Although no sex

differences are hypothesized for actual amount of influence exerted,
it is expected that the female minority should be perceived as less
influential than the male minority, consistent with previous findings
(Nemeth, Endicott, & Wachtler, 1976).
Finally, female group members should be more influenced by the
minority than should male group members, although the effect size
should be small.

Recent reviews (Eagly & Carli, 1981; Eagly, 1983;

Eagly, Wood, 6c Fishbaugh, 1981) concluded that women are more
influenceable than men, particularly in the type of experimental
setting used in the present study (i.e., mixed-sex group pressure
situation involving surveillance by the influence agent).
size, however, was found to be small.

The effect

Further, the trend of less

persuasibility of women in more recent studies (Eagly 6c Carli, 1981)
should contribute to the small effect size.
In summary, the current study examined the effects of decision
rule, minority discrepancy, minority sex, and group-member sex on the
minority's ability to influence group members in a mock-jury
deliberation of a monetary award in a civil negligence case.

The

mixed-sex groups deliberated under either a unanimous or majority
decision rule, and were composed of 4 or 5 naive group members and a
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confederate (either male or female), who expressed a minority opinion
that was either high or low in discrepancy from the other group
members.

It was expected that minorities would be more influential

when they were not highly discrepant from the group norm, and when the
group was deliberating under a unanimous decision rule.

It was

expected that female minorities would be considered less influential
than their male counterparts, although equally influential.

It also

was expected that female group members would be more influenceable
than male group members.

CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
The subjects were 110 students (53 females and 57 males) from
introductory psychology classes at the College of William and Mary in
Virginia.

These individuals,

who volunteered to participate

in a

study described as "a research project on the decision-making process
of a group", were chosen from a slightly larger group who completed
the first phase of the experiment, as described in the next section.
Procedure
Volunteers were scheduled for experimental sessions such that one
to three deliberation groups could be conducted simultaneously.

Upon

arrival, participants and confederates were read a description of the
experiment (see Appendix A for full instructions) and were assigned an
identification number that was used for encoding all data.

Each

person was given a copy of the case history of a Robert Smith (see
Appendix B) . Mr. Smith was a washing-machine repairman who was
injured at a customer's house and who was suing the homeowner, Mr.
Davis, for "the past and present pain and suffering and the worry and
grief which he has undergone as a result of this accident" and "the
irrevocable loss to him of an important aspect of his life, his
ability to participate in the game of bowling."

The case history

stated "it was established during the course of the trial that Mr.
Davis and his insurance company are indeed responsible to Mr. Smith
31
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and should indeed reimburse him for his losses."

This amount would be

in addition to the amount Mr. Smith's insurance company had paid, and
would continue to pay, for his hospital bills and loss of wages.
After reading this case summary, participants completed a
questionnaire (see Appendix C) which asked for the amount theythought
Mr. Smith should receive, as well as the highest and lowest amounts
they would be willing to agree to "for the sake of a group agreement."
As the volunteers completed reading the case history and answering the
questionnaire, their written responses were collected.

Individuals

who gave an answer less than $9000 in response to the first question
were eliminated from the experiment, but were not told this until the
other participants had adjourned to separate deliberation rooms.

This

resulted in a very small proportion of the larger sample being
excluded.

Those who met the requirement (i.e., whose answer to the

first question was equal to or greater than $9000) were assigned to
groups such that there were approximately equal numbers of men and
women in each group (16 of the 24 groups had three men and three
women, including the confederates).

Groups consisted of one

confederate and four or five naive subjects.

Identification numbers

were called to designate juries, and participants were asked whether
they knew any of their fellow jurors.

There were only a few

affirmatives, and substitutions were made.

Students who only knew

each other only by sight were allowed to remain in the same group, but
even this was infrequent.
Jurors were led to a deliberation room and sat around a six-sided
table, so there were no head or side positions.

Confederates had been
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instructed previously to sit in a different seat each time without
drawing attention to their seating preference.
According to the decision rule to be employed (either unanimous
or non-unanimous), the experimenter read the instructions and left the
jurors to discuss the case for thirty minutes (see Appendix D for
complete instructions).

Although no specific rule (e.g., 2/3

majority) was given in the non-unanimous condition, a majority rule
was implicit, given the expectations of jury deliberation and the
experimenter's instruction that they did not have to reach a unanimous
decision.

During the discussion period the confederate initially

expressed one of two discrepancy positions:

Mr. Smith should receive

only $3000 (high discrepancy) or Mr. Smith should receive only $7000
(low discrepancy). At some point 5 to 10 minutes into the discussion,
the confederate increased his/her initial amount by $1000, in order to
demonstrate some flexibility and to reduce the likelihood that the
group would become suspicious.

The confederates defended their

position with memorized arguments (see Appendix E).

They were allowed

to paraphrase these arguments in response to questions, but not to
elaborate or give other reasons for their position.
At the end of the discussion interval the experimenter returned
and asked each juror for his/her final (public) vote on the amount Mr.
Smith should receive.

Participants' identification number, group

number, and final public vote were noted on a questionnaire booklet
(Appendix F), which was then given to the individual.

This

questionnaire asked for their final personal opinion of how much Mr.
Smith should be awarded, since "in the interest of reaching a
compromise in the group you may have agreed to an amount greater or
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lesser than the amount you really think Mr. Smith should receive."
Other measures were included to ascertain the individual's
satisfaction with the group discussion and outcome, topic importance,
and perceived similarity to other group members.

Then each

participant rated each group member on 17 characteristics:
Consistency, independence, level of activity, cooperativeness,
centrality to the discussion, warmth, strength of will,
perceptiveness, leadership, fairness, confidence, reasonableness,
ability to make the participant reassess his/her opinion, likeability,
admirability, similarity to the participant in life philosophy, and
similarity to the participant in philosophy on the specific case.
After all booklets were completed and collected, an extensive
debriefing session was held.

No subject expressed any suspicions of

the confederate, even when asked whether they had any doubts about the
sincerity of any of their fellow jurors.

However, one male

participant responded that at one point early in the discussion
session he had wondered whether or not another juror (not a
confederate) was "working with" the experimenter.

Even when told that

there was a confederate in the group, the participants were still
unable to identify him/her.

That the participants were genuinely

involved with the discussion topic was demonstrated by the fact that
in almost all cases, the jurors' initial response to having the
confederate identified was to ask for his/her real opinion on the
case.

The rationale for the study and the necessity of having a

confederate was explained.
To summarize, mixed groups consisting of four or five
participants and one male or female confederate deliberated for 30
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minutes on the amount which should be awarded to a Mr. Smith for "the
pain and suffering" incurred as a result of an accident
dependent variable).

(i.e., the

The confederate maintained either a high-

discrepancy position ($3000 - $4000) or a low-discrepancy position
($7000 - $8000) from the group members, all of whom initially wanted
to award an amount between $9000 and $35,000.

The final manipulated

variable was decision rule (unanimous or non-unanimous).

The

resulting experimental design was a 2 (male-female subject sex) X 2
(male-female minority/confederate sex) X 2 (unanimous-nonunanimous
decision rule) X 2 (high-low discrepancy) between subjects factorial
design.
Data Analyses
The dependent measures fall into two categories:

monetary awards

and perceptions of group members. The monetary measures were analyzed
with 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 (Sex of Majority X Sex of Minority X Discrepancy
from Group X Decision Rule) Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs) with
repeated measures for initial and final public awards.

The 17

perception variables were analyzed with 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVAs (Sex of
Majority X Sex of Minority X Discrepancy from Group X Decision Rule),
with repeated measures of two scores: (1) the individual's rating of
the confederate on the variable and (2) the mean of that individual's
ratings of the other majority members on that variable.

That is, the

person's perceptions of the minority were compared with that person's
average perception of the other group members.

For all 17 variables,

a score of 1 denoted that the variable applied not at all to the ratee
and 9 indicated that the variable applied very much.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
An analysis to determine whether the initial final public
judgments were different from the final private judgments
demonstrated that the mean final public award ($16,795) was not
significantly different from the mean final private award ($17,177),
F(l,94) - 2.5, p > .10.

In the interest of brevity, only analyses

with the final public judgment are reported, as the pattern for the
final private judgments are virtually identical.
Participants were asked whether they (or relatives or close
friends) had ever been involved in a similar accident, as it seemed
possible that one's views could be influenced by personal exposure to
such a case.

Of the 110 participants, only 17 indicated that they, or

someone they knew, had been involved in a similar situation.

An

analysis performed on the change from initial judgment to final public
judgment with involvement as the only independent variable showed no
significant difference as a result of involvement, F(1,108) - 1.10, p
> .29.
The importance of the topic to the participant was used as a
covariate

i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2

ANOVA for initial and final public

judgments.

The covariate was not significant, F(l,93) - 1.8, p > .17,

indicating

that

the

results

were

not

assessment of the topic's importance.
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influenced by

the

subject's
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General Findings
The monetary data were first analyzed to determine whether there
was a significant decrease in final judgment from the initial award
judgment.

The 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA with repeated measures for initial

and final private judgments showed an overall decrease, £(1,94) —
34.5, £ < .01, with the mean initial award ($21,636) significantly
different from the mean final judgment ($17,177).

However, given the

lack of appropriate control condition, it cannot be determined
definitely that minority influence is the explanation for this effect.
Alternate explanations, such as regression to the mean, cannot be
ruled out.
The perceptual data, which contrasted each group member's
perceptions of the minority with his/her averaged perceptions of the
other group members, are summarized in Table 1.

The data showed that,

overall, group majority members, when compared to the minority, were
considered more cooperative, F(l,94) - 133.6, |> < .01, more
perceptive, £(1,94) - 10.7, j> < .01, more reasonable, £(1,94) - 75.3,
E < .01, more likeable, £(1,94) - 8.2,

e

fs -01, more similar to the

subject in life philosophy, £(1,94) — 12.0,

e

^ -01), more similar to

the subject on the discussed case, F(l,94) - 48.8,

e

F(1,94) - 13.1, £ < -01, and fairer, £(1.94) - 63.3,

^ *01, warmer,
e

< -01.

On the other hand, the minority confederate, as compared to the
other group members, was considered to be more consistent, £(1,94) «
41.1,

e

^ -01, more confident, £(1,94) - 14.4,

leader, £(1,94) - 7.6,

e

e

^ *01, more of a

^ -01, more independent, £(1,94) — 133.6,

.01, more central to the discussion, £(1,94) -* 23.8,

e

^ .01), more

e

^
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strong-willed, F(l,94) - 142.9, |> < .01, and more active, F(l,94) —
68.5, p < .01.
In addition, minorities were seen as making individuals reassess
their opinions more than other group members, F(l,94) — 3.5, £ — .06.
There was no difference between minority and majority group members on
only one of the 17 perception variables. No difference was seen
between the minorities and the other group members in terms of how
admirable they were, F(l,94) - .61, p > .43.
Decision Rule and Discrepancy Effects
The analysis of the change from initial to final public award
yielded an interaction between decision rule and discrepancy that
approached accepted levels of significance, F(l,94) - 3.58, p — .06.
As can be seen in Table 2, the greatest changes from initial to final
award occurred in the unanimous, low discrepancy and the nonunanimous, high discrepancy conditions, while the least change
occurred in the non-unanimous, low discrepancy condition.

This same

pattern was repeated in the analysis of change from initial to final
private award, where the decision rule X discrepancy interaction was
significant, £(1,94) - 6.02, p < .05.
As shown in Table 3, two of the 17 perception variables
demonstrated a decision rule effect for repeated measures on
perceptions of minority and majority group members.

The minority was

considered more consistent than the majority F(l,94) — 8.67, p < .01,
and less cooperative F(l,94) — 7.15, p < .01 in the unanimous than in
the non-unanimous condition.
Two significant effects were found for the discrepancy variable,
shown in Table 4.

The minority in the low discrepancy condition was
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liked less, F(l,94) - 4.67, £ < .05, and was seen as less like the
subjects in life philosophy, F(l,94) - 4.33, £ < .05, than the highdiscrepancy minority.
Two significant two-way interactions were found for decision
rule and discrepancy, depicted in Table 5.

Subjects saw the greatest

difference between majority members and the minority's cooperativeness
in the unanimous, low discrepancy condition, £(1,94) — 4.50, £ < .05.
In the low discrepancy condition, the minority was considered more
confident than the majority when a unanimous decision rule rather than
a non-unanimous one was used, whereas the reverse was true in the high
discrepancy condition, F(l,94) — 11.17, £ < .01.
Three two-way interactions were found for Sex of Minority and
Decision Rule, shown in Table 6.

Female minorities in the unanimous

condition were considered as strong-willed as male minorities when
compared to majority members, whereas females in the non-unanimous
condition were not, F(l,94) - 4.98, £ < .05.

The greater difference

between the perception of the minority and majority in terms of
leadership occurred in the unanimous condition for male minorities,
whereas the least difference occurred for female minorities in the
non-unanimous condition, F(l,94) — 4.78, £ < .05.

The least

difference in perceived fairness occurred in the unanimous condition
for male minorities, and the greatest difference for female minorities
under that same decision rule, F(l,94) — 5.21, £ < .05.
In summary, these three interactions indicate that female
minorities are particularly negatively evaluated in terms of their
leadership and strength of will under a non-unanimous decision rule.
Male minorities, on the other hand, are especially perceived as

40

leaders under a unanimous decision rule.

Finally, in marked contrast

to male minorities, female minorities are judged as unfair under a
unanimous decision rule.
Finally, group members in the non-unanimous condition were more
satisfied with the group discussion (M - 7.06) than those in the
unanimous condition (M — 6.36), F(l,94) — 4.10, 2 < .05.

Those in the

non-unanimous condition were also more satisfied with the group's
final decision (M — 5.69) than those in the unanimous condition (M —
4.60), F(1,94) - 6.55, 2 < -05.
Sex Differences
There were no sex effects for any of the monetary measures,
indicating that (1) there were no significant differences in amount
of minority influence due to the sex of the minority, and (2) male
and female group members were not differentially influenced.
Seven of the 17 perception measures yielded main effects for
sex of minority, and these effects demonstrate a consistent pattern:
On five variables male minorities were assessed more positively than
other group members or than female minorities, whereas female
confederates were rated less favorably than male minorities or other
group members on two variables. As Table 7 shows, male minorities
were considered more of a leader, F(l,94) - 15.64, 2 < .01, more
active, F(l,94) — 7.0, 2 ^ .01, central to the discussion F(l,94) —
4.62, 2 ^ *05, more confident, F(l,94) - 4.45, ]> < .05, and were
credited more with making the subjects reassess their opinions,
F(l,94) - 12.58, 2 ^ -01.

Female minorities, as compared to male

minorities and majority group members, were considered least
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perceptive, F(l,94) - 5.21, p < .05, and least fair, F(l,94) - 7.14, p

< .01).
There were no main effects for sex of majority group member,
however, there were two significant two-way interactions (with
repeated measures on perceptions of minority versus majority group
members) between sex of minority and majority (see Table 8).

Male and

female majority members felt that a male minority, when compared to
the majority, made them reassess their opinions, with this effect
being especially pronounced for the female majority members, who also
indicated that a female minority was less influential in this regard
than other group members, F(l,94) - 3.86, p < .05.

Male majority

members found male minority members to be very admirable, compared to
the overall group, whereas female majority members saw little
difference, E(l,94) — 3.80, p < .05.

However, (and, again, unlike the

male majority), the female majority considered the female minority
less admirable than the other group members.

The overall pattern

indicates that male minorities were positively evaluated by males and
females alike, whereas female group members were particularly
censorious of female minorities.
Finally, group members with a male minority were more satisfied
with the group discussion (M — 7.05) than those with a female minority
(M - 6.37), F(1,94) - 3.84, p < .05.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The present study examined the effects of decision rule (i.e.,
unanimous or non-unanimous), minority-majority discrepancy, minority
sex, and majority group member sex on the minority's ability to
influence group members.

The experimental setting was a mock-jury

deliberation of a monetary award in a civil negligence case.

The

results showed that a minority's influence is related to the
interactive effects of decision rule and minority's discrepancy from
the majority.

Consistent with previous findings, the minority group

member was considered less likeable, but was more influential, than
other group members. Although group members were influenced equally
by male and female minorities (as measured by the change in initial to
final compensatory judgments), group members of both sexes perceived
the female minority as less influential than the male minority.
Monetary Measures
Previous research has suggested that minorities are more
influential under a unanimous decision rule, and when they are not
very discrepant from the majority.

Law scholars and other individuals

concerned with civil liberties have argued that majority rule weakens
the judicial system by allowing jurors to disregard dissenting, and
possibly valid, opinions.

Social influence researchers have found

that minorities who express opinions that are in strong contrast to
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those of the majority are usually ostracized and dismissed as
deviates.
The present study, however, failed to find these simple effects
on a minority's ability to exert influence.

Instead, decision rule

and minority-majority discrepancy interacted, such that minority
influence was greatest under the combined conditions of a unanimous
decision rule and low minority-majority discrepancy, and least under a
non-unanimous decision rule and low discrepancy.

That is, the groups

with the greatest and least amount of change differed only on the
decision rule.

High discrepancy, regardless of decision rule, was

associated with intermediate levels of minority influence.
Apparently, the minority stating a low discrepancy opinion is
tolerated, but is relatively ineffectual in the absence of pressure to
reach a unanimous decision.

Conversely, when individuals are

instructed to reach a unanimous decision, a low discrepant minority is
the most influential, perhaps because the minority is close enough to
the majority opinion to avoid being dismissed as a deviate.

Whereas

in the non-unanimous condition the Majority may simply accept the
minority's view without feeling any external pressure to modify their
own opinion, under a unanimous decision rule the majority is faced
with one "hold out" who really isn't that different from the group.
It appears from this study that jurors who are in mild
disagreement are far more likely to be influenced by a minority when
they are deliberating under a unanimous decision rule, while it is
easier to agree to disagree under a majority rule.

On the other hand,

greater disagreement seems to lead to an intermediate level of
influence by the minority regardless of decision rule.

The level of
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disagreement is sufficient in itself to generate discussion, argument
and modification of opinions.
The current study used a civil case rather than a criminal case.
It seems likely that civil cases, at least where the deliberation
concern monetary awards, are more likely than criminal cases to have
minorities who disagree with the majority only mildly.

Criminal

cases, where a forced-choice decision is required, are more likely to
be characterized by high levels of discrepancy (i.e., guilty or
innocent) between minorities and majorities.

The implication is that

a unanimous decision rule may actually have a greater effect on
minority influence in civil cases than in criminal ones, but only in
situations where there isn't too much difference between the jurors
anyway.

Given the costs associated with the judicial system, it may

be that unanimity decision rules are not cost effective for civil
cases.

Further, given that minority influence is not affected by

decision rule when there is high discrepancy, it may be that unanimous
decision rules are less necessary in criminal cases than previously
thought.

Obviously these findings are only suggestive, but they do

indicate that future research should consider a more complex interplay
of factors, rather than a narrow focus on only one variable affecting
the issue.
Implications for the legal literature need to be qualified,
given that no explicit majority rule was stated for the non-unanimous
groups.

Subjects were only told that they were not required to reach

a unanimous decision.

Given conventional knowledge of jury

deliberations, it seems reasonable to assume that the participants
were operating under an implicit majority rule.

Future research,
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however, should indicate an explicit majority rule (e.g., a 2/3
majority rule).
Contrary to findings by Nemeth (1977), members of the unanimous
decision groups were less satisfied than non-unanimous group members
with the group's final decision.

Nemeth found, however, that

unanimous decision group members were less comfortable during the
discussion.

Indeed, in the present study those under the unanimous

rule were less satisfied with the group's discussion than those under
the non-unanimous rule.
findings?

Why only a partial replication of Nemeth's

Possibly because no unanimous-rule groups ever reached a

unanimous decision, unlike Nemeth's groups which deliberated until
they reached consensus.

In the present study, the unanimous decision

rule groups failed to reach their goal, whereas non-unanimous rule
groups had no external goal imposed on them at all.

Hence, it seems

reasonable that those in the unanimous decision rule groups would
indeed be less satisfied with both the discussion and the group's
final decision.
Previous research (e.g., Brown, 1979) has found a general
tendency in group interactions for males to be more influential than
females.

In contrast, the literature on mock-jury deliberations

(e.g., Nemeth et al, 1976) suggests that there should be no difference
in the amount of influence exerted by males or females.

Further, the

single study which has looked at sex differences in minority influence
in mock-jury deliberations (Arbuthnot & Wagner, 1982) found no
evidence of superior male influence.

The present study supported the

previous mock-jury research, and found no difference in the ability of
male and female minorities to influence group members.
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The present study also addressed the previously unexplored issue
of sex differences in influenceability in response to minority
influence attempts.

Previous research (e.g., Eagly & Carli, 1981;

Eagly et al., 1981; Eagly, 1983) has suggested that women are more
influenced than men in group pressure situations, although the effect
size is usually small.

As with minority sex, this study found no

difference in the influenceability of male and female majority
members.

Further, there was no interaction between sex of minority

and sex of majority.

No differences were found in public versus

private judgments, indicating that majority members did not publicly
follow social norms (i.e., men publicly agreeing with a woman, and
women publicly agreeing with a man), while holding discrepant private
opinions.
Instead, the findings support Nemeth, Endicott, and Wachtler's
(1976) conclusion that women (at least in a mock-jury situation) are
not really different from men in their ability to influence, nor in
their tendency to be influenced, but are perceived by both men and
women to be less influential and more persuadable than men.

These

normative expectations may explain, in part, the finding that the
majority (both males and females) expressed greater satisfaction with
the group discussion when the minority was male rather than female.
This explanation gains credibility when the majority's perceptions of
the minority are considered.
Perceptions of the Minority
Main effects.

Earlier research (Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974) has

shown that a minority is considered more consistent, independent,
active, central, strong-willed, confident, more of a leader and is
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believed by the majority to have made them reassess their opinions
more than others in the group.

Further, the majority is less liked

and considered less fair, reasonable, perspective, warm, cooperative,
admired, and wanted than others.
the present study.

These findings were replicated in

Although the main effect for "admirable" was not

significant, an interaction between sex of minority and sex of
majority on this variable, discussed below, accounts for this.

In

addition, the minority was considered less similar to the majority in
the case they discussed (verifying the perception of the confederate
as a minority), and also less similar to the majority in life
philosophy.

The latter points out an interesting generalization on

the part of the majority.

It can be seen that the main effects for

the perceptions of the minority support previous research and
emphasize that the minority’s influence is not dependent on how much
they are liked, or how similar they are seen to be.
Rule and discrepancy effects.

In addition to affecting the

amount of influence exerted by the minority, decision rule and
minority-majority discrepancy also affected the majority's assessment
of the minority.

Past research has suggested that the perception of

consistency and confidence are important for successful minority
influence.

The present study found that a minority is considered more

consistent under a unanimous decision rule, and that minority
influence was at either high or intermediate levels under a unanimous
rule.

Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) found that choosing to sit at the

head of a table apparently increases the impression of confidence, and
leads to greater minority influence.

The present study found that the

interactive effects of minority-majority discrepancy and decision rule
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also vary the impression of the minority's confidence.

Minorities

expressing a low discrepant opinion under a unanimous decision rule,
or a high discrepant opinion under a non-unanimous decision rule, were
considered more confident than other group members, and exerted high
and intermediate levels of minority influence, respectively.
These results support the previous research, and they indicate
the particular importance of the combination of perceived consistency
and confidence.

The greatest amount of minority influence occurred in

the unanimous, low discrepancy condition, where the minority was seen
as both consistent and confident.

Whereas in the two intermediate

conditions only one factor was salient:

The minority was considered

more confident than the majority in one case (non-unanimous, high
discrepancy) and more consistent in the other (unanimous decision,
high discrepancy).

The least amount of minority influence occurred

where the minority was not seen as different from the majority either
in terms of consistency or of confidence.
The present study also verifies Nemeth and Wachtler's
interpretation of their findings.

They used confidence as an implied

variable; that is, they had the minority person either choose or be
assigned to the head seat at the discussion table, and they assumed
that the majority members interpreted the choosing of the head chair
as a sign of confidence.

By allowing group members in the present

study to rate the minority and majority members on confidence, we have
gained verification that the majority considers the effective minority
member more confident.
The minority who took a low discrepancy position under a
unanimous decision rule was considered particularly uncooperative
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compared to other group members.

Perhaps the group members found it

especially frustrating that someone would refuse to go along with the
group when there wasn't very much difference in their positions and
there was the pressure to reach unanimity.

This finding is

interesting given that the greatest amount of minority influence
occurred in this condition, again pointing out that minority influence
is not dependent on positive personal attributions from the majority.
Decision rule also differentially affected perceptions of male
and female minorities, but these findings will be considered in the
next section.
Sex differences.

Of the 17 dependent measures of majority

perceptions of the minority versus the majority, only four
(independence, warmth, reasonableness, and similarity to respondent in
life philosophy) failed to have a sex of minority or sex of majority
effect.

Overall, the data support the findings of Nemeth and Wachtler

(1974) that a female minority is viewed less favorably and considered
less of a leader than a male minority.

Majority members of both sexes

usually agreed on their view of the female minority's inferiority.
In comparison to other group members, male minorities, more than
female minorities, were considered more a leader, as well as more
confident, more active, more central to the discussion, and more
responsible for making group members reassess their opinions.
Decision rule also affected perceptions of male and female
minorities.

Male minorities under either decision rule and female

minorities under a unanimous rule were considered stronger willed than
the majority, whereas considerably less difference was seen between
the group and a female minority under a non-unanimous decision rule.
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The same general pattern held for perceptions of leadership, although
male minorities were particularly seen as more of leaders compared to
the group under a unanimous decision rule.

Finally, the least

difference in terms of fairness between minority and majority occurred
for male minorities under a unanimous decision rule, whereas the
greatest difference occurred for female minorities under that same
rule.
Arbuthnot and Wagner (1982) found that only women who chose the
head seat and took a minority position were able to overcome negative
stereotypic assessments of being less able to lead and to influence
the group.

They interpreted these findings as support for the notion

that women must display "more of a given attribute than the male in
order to achieve the same outcome" (p. 293).

In the present study,

women expressing a minority opinion under a non-unanimous decision
rule were not seen to be leaders or strong-willed.

Perhaps the non-

unanimous decision rule, with its lack of external pressure for the
group to reach consensus, creates a weak situation for female
minorities, just as does a situation where the minority is unable to
choose the head seat.

That is, the lack of external pressure, in

combination with stereotypic expectations for female behavior, may
create a situation where the female minority's discrepant behavior can
be more easily overlooked.

The unanimous decision rule, which was

found to increase the perception of the minority's consistency, may
serve to emphasize the female minority's "unusual" behavior.

The

group, in effect, has to notice that she is disagreeing with them.
That female minorities are considered particularly unfair in this
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condition indicates that their behavior is not judged positively by
the group.
This explanation of stereotypic expectations would also account
for the enhanced perception of the male minority as a leader and as
fair under the unanimous decision rule.

The unanimous decision rule,

by increasing the pressure on the group, may essentially serve to
highlight the behavior of the minority.

Although the majority may

still find the minority irritating, they may grudgingly agree that the
behavior is appropriate for males--but not for females!
When the sexes disagreed on their assessment of the minority,
women were the ones who were more censorious of the female minority.
Male group members considered male minorities more admirable than
other group members, whereas there was little difference between their
admiration for female minorities and other group members.

Female

majority members, however, expressed little difference in admiration
for male minorities and the majority, but found a female minority less
admirable than the rest of their group.

Both male and female majority

members felt that the male minority, in comparison to other group
members, made them reassess their opinions, with this effect being
particularly strong for female majority members.

But whereas male

majority members saw little difference between the group and a female
minority, the female majority members said that a female minority was
less able to make them reassess their opinions.
Conclusions
In summary, the present study extends previous findings and
suggests directions for future research.
research were integrated:

Two different streams of

One dealing with the effect of decision
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rules on jury deliberation and the other with the effect of minoritymajority discrepancy on minority influence.

Of interest to judicial

scholars is the finding that the decision rule issue is influenced by
the minority's discrepancy from the group's norm.

A low-discrepancy

minority exerted greatest influence under a unanimity decision rule,
and least under a non-unanimity decision rule.

It appears that for

deliberations where there is relatively less disagreement between the
minority and majority, the decision rule is critical in affecting the
minority's ability to influence the majority.

Where disagreement is

great, however, decision rule is irrelevant, in that an intermediate
level of minority influence occurred under both unanimity and non
unanimity decision rules.

It was suggested that civil cases (or, at

least, the process of deciding upon monetary awards) would be more
likely to be characterized by lesser minority-majority discrepancy,
whereas criminal cases (which necessitate a forced choice between
guilt and innocence) would be more likely to have greater discrepancy
If those assumptions are valid, it follows that a unanimity decision
rule is more important in civil than criminal cases, but only when
there is little discrepancy between the minority and majority anyway.
The implications for the judicial system could be very important if
the less-costly majority decision rule could be substituted for the
unanimous decision rule.

Future research should focus on verifying

the present findings, as well as determining whether the important
issue of public confidence in the judicial system would be harmed by
moving away from unanimous decision rules.

Most importantly, the

present research illustrates the need to consider how other factors

53

interact with decision rules to facilitate or hinder a minority's
ability to influence the majority.
Of interest to minority and social influence researchers is the
finding that situational variables can affect a minority's ability to
exert influence.

Decision rule determines whether a low-discrepancy

minority exerts considerable influence (i.e., under a unanimous rule)
or very little (i.e., under a non-unanimous rule).

Further, it was

found that high-discrepancy minorities were not ignored by the group,
although it should be noted that they exerted less influence (under
both decision rules) than a low-discrepancy minority under a unanimous
decision rule.

These findings qualify previous research regarding

rejection of a deviate (at least in relative terns), but indicating
that it is not the amount of discrepancy alone which determines the
minority's ability to influence the majority.

In general the minority

was evaluated less favorably than other group members, but was still
able to exert influence.
Finally, majority group members of both sexes were influenced
equally by male and female minorities, but in spite of this, believed
that the female minority was less influential than the male minority.
This finding may reflect that changes in stereotypical expectations
lag behind behavioral changes.

That is, majority members may be

equally influenced by males and females, as in the present case, but
their expectations may still be that they will be more influenced by a
male.

Further, their evaluations of male versus female minorities

confirm that they more highly value "deviant” behavior in males than
females. Argumentative males are leaders, whereas argumentative
females are a nuisance.

It seems likely that 40 years ago a study of
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this nature would have found that males were more influential, as well
as perceived as more influential.

Perhaps future research will find

that stereotypic expectations and actual behaviors are again
congruent, with minorities of either sex being regarded as leaders.

55

REFERENCES
Apodaca. Cooper and Madden v. Oregon.

92 U.S. 1928, 1972.

Arbuthnot, J., & Wayner, M. (1982). Minority influence: Effects of
size, conversion, and sex. The Journal of Psychology. Ill. 285295.
Asch,

S. E.
(1951). Effects of group pressure upon the modification
and distortion of judgments. In H. Guetzkow (Ed.) Groups.
leadership, and men. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press, 177-190.

Asch,

S. E.
(1952).
Prentice-Hall.

Asch,

S. E.
(1956). Studies of independence and submission to group
pressure: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority.
Psychological Monographs. 70. (9, Whole No. 416).

Social psychology.

Englewood Cliffs, NJ:

Berger, J., Cohen, B. P., & Zelditch, M. , Jr.
characteristics and social interaction.
Review. 37, 241-255.

(1972). Status
American Sociological

Berger, J., Fisek, M. H . , Norman, R. Z., & Zelditch, M . , Jr.
(1977).
Status characteristics and social interaction: An expectation
states approach. New York: American Elsevier.
Berger, J., Rosenholtz, S. J., & Zelditch, M . , Jr.
(1980). Status
organizing processes. In A. Inkeles, N. J. Smelser, & R. H.
Turner (Eds.), Annual Review of Sociology. Vol. 6. Palo Alto:
CA: Annual Reviews.
Brown, L. K.
288.

(1979).

Women and business management.

Cartwright, D . , & Zander, A.
York: Harper and Row.
Cohen, B. P. (1963).
M.I.T. Press.

(1968).

Signs.

266-

Group dynamics (3rd ed.) New

Conflict and conformity.

Cambridge, MA:

Cohen, J.
(1977). Statistical power analysis for the behavior
sciences (2nd ed.). New York: Academic Press.
Cooper, H. M.
(1979). Statistically combining independent studies:
A meta-analysis of sex differences in conformity research.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 37, 131-146.

56

Crano, W. D. (1970). Effects of sex, response order, and expertise
in conformity: A dispositional approach. Sociometrv. 33, 239252.
Deutsch, M . , & Gerard, H. B. (1955). A study of normative and
informational social influences upon individual judgment.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 51. 629-636.
Eagly, A. H. (1978). Sex differences in influenceability.
Psychological Bulletin. 85, 86-116.
Eagly, A. H. (1983). Gender and social influence:
A social
psychological analysis. American Psychologist. 38, 971-981.
Eagly, A. H . , & Carli, L. L. (1981). Sex of researchers and sextyped communications as determinants of sex differences in
influenceability: A meta-analysis of social influence studies.
Psychological Bulletin. 90, 1-20.
Eagly, A. H . , & Wood, W. (1982). Inferred sex differences in status
as a determinant of gender stereotypes about social influence.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 43, 915-928.
Eagly, A. H . , Wood, W . , & Fishbaugh, L. (1981). Sex differences in
conformity: Surveillance by the group as a determinant of male
nonconformity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
40, 384-394.
Goldberg, C. (1975). Conformity to majority type as a function of
task and acceptance of sex-related stereotypes. Journal of
Psychology. 89, 25-37.
Goldberg, S. C. (1954). Three situational determinants of conformity
to social norms. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 49,
325-329.
Helson, H . , Blake, R. R . , & Mouton, J. S. (1958). An experimental
investigation of the effectiveness of the "big lie" in shifting
attitudes. Journal of Social Psychology. 48, 51-60.
Jacobs, R. C., & Campbell, D. T. (1961). The perpetuation of an
arbitrary tradition through several generations of a laboratory
microculture. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 62.
649-658.
Johnson v. Louisiana.

92 U.S. 1935, 1972.

Johnson, R. W . , & MacDonnell, J. (1974). The relationship between
conformity and male and female attitudes toward women. Journal
of Social Psychology. 94. 155-156.
Kalven, H . , Jr., & Zeisel, H.
Little, Brown.

(1966).

The American iurv.

Boston:

57

Kerr, N. L. , Atkin, R. S., Stasser, G . , Meek, D. , Holt, R. W. , &
Davis, J. H. (1976). Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: Effect
of concept definition and assigned decision rule on the
judgments of mock jurors. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology. 34, 282-295.
Knower, F. H. (1935). Experimental studies of changes in attitudes:
I . A study of the effect of oral argument on changes of
attitude. Journal of Social Psychology. 6, 315-345.
Latane, B. (1981). The psychology of social impact.
Psychologist. 36, 343-356.

American

Latand, B. , & Wolf, S. (1981). The social impact of majorities and
minorities. Psychological Review. 88. 438-453.
Luchins, A. S. (1955). A variational approach to social influences
on perception. Journal of Social Psychology. 42, 113-119.
Maass, A., & Clark, R. D. , III.
(1984). Hidden impact of minorities:
Fifteen years of minority influence research. Psychological
Bulletin. 95, 428-450.
Maccoby, E. E., & Jacklin, C. N. (1974). The psychology of sex
differences. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Meade, R. D . , & Barnard, W. A. (1973). Conformity and anticonformity
among Americans and Chinese. Journal of Social Psychology. 89.
15-24.
Meade, R. D . , & Barnard, W. A. (1975). Group pressure effects on
American and Chinese females. Journal of Social Psychology. 96,
137-138.
Meeker, B. F. , & Weitzel-O'Neill, P. A. (1977). Sex roles and
interpersonal behavior in task-oriented groups. American
Sociological Review. 42, 91-105.
Meyers, D. G . , & Arenson, S. J. (1968). Stimulus factors in
conformity. Journal of Social Psychology. 76. 37-41.
Miller, G. R. , & McReynolds, W. (1973). Male chauvinism and source
competence: A research note. Speech Monographs. 40, 154-155.
Moscovici, S. (1985). Social influence and conformity. In G.
Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology. Vol.
II (3rd ed.). New York: Random House, 347-412.
Moscovici, S.,
bias and
Advances
Academic

& Faucheux, C. (1972). Social influence, conformity
the study of active minorities. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.)
in experimental social psychology. Vol. 6. New York:
Press.

58

Moscovici, S., Lage, E., & Naffrechoux, M. (1969). Influence of a
consistent minority on the responses of a majority in a color
perception task. Sociometrv. 32, 365-379.
Moscovici, S., & Nemeth, C. (1974). Social influence: II. Minority
influence. In C. Nemeth (Ed.), Social psychology: Classic and
contemporary integrations. Chicago: Rand McNally, 217-249.
Nemeth, C. (1977). Interactions between jurors as a function of
majority versus unanimity decision rules. Journal of Applied
Social Psychology. 2» 38-56.
Nemeth, C. (1981). Jury trials:
Psychology and law. In L.
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology.
Vol. 14, New York: Academic Press, 309-367.
Nemeth, C., Endicott, J., & Wachtler, J. (1976). From the '50s to
the '70s: Women in jury deliberations. Sociometrv. 39, 293304.
Nemeth, C., Swedlund, M . , & Kanki, B. (1974). Patterning of the
minority’s responses and their influence on the majority.
European Journal of Social Psychology. 4, 53-64.
Nemeth, C.,& Wachtler, J. (1974). Creating the perceptions of
consistency and confidence: A necessary condition for minority
influence. Sociometrv, 37, 529-540.
Nemeth, C., & Wachtler, J. (1983). Creative problem solving as a
result of majority versus minority influence. European Journal
of Social Psychology. 13. 45-55.
Olmstead, J. A., & Blake, R. R. (1955). The use of simulated groups
to produce modifications in judgment. Journal of Personality.
23, 335-345.
Saks, M. J., & Hastie, R. (1978). Social psychology in court.
York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold.

New

Schachter, S. (1951). Deviation, rejection, and communication.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 46, 190-207.
Schroder, H. M . , & Hunt, D. E. (1958). Dispositional effects upon
conformity at different levels of discrepancy. Journal of
Personality. 26, 243-258.
Sherif, M.
(1936). The psychology of social norms.
Harper and Row.

New York:

Sistrunk, F. , & McDavid, J. W. (1971). Sex variable in conformity
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 17,
200-207.

59

Tanford, S., & Penrod, S. (1984). Social influence model: A formal
integration of research on majority andminorityinfluence
processes. Psychological Bulletin. 95.189-225.
Tuddenham, R. D. (1958). The influence of a distorted group norm
upon individual judgment. Journal of Psychology. 46, 227-241.
Whittacker, J. 0. (1964). Parameters of social influence in the
autokinetic situation. Sociometrv. 27.88-95.
Wolf, S. (1985).
minorities.
899-908.

Manifest and latent influence of majorities and
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 48,

60

TABLE 1
GENERAL FINDINGS:
CONTRASTS OF EACH GROUP MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE MINORITY
WITH THEIR AVERAGED PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER GROUP MEMBERS

MEANS
Minority Group
Member
Cooperative
Reasonable
Fair
Similar to rater on
discussed case
Warm
Similar to rater on
life philosophy
Perceptive
Likeable
Strong-willed
Independent
Active
Consistent
Central to the discussion
Confident
Leader
Made raters reassess
their opinions

FQ.94)
Majority Group
Member

4.34
4.82
4.99
3.54

6.48
6.58
6.56
5.80

133.6
75.3
63.3
48.8

5.57
4.55

6.33
5.45

13.1
12.0

5.60
6.20
7.97
8.24
7.74
7.90
7.16
7.14
6.04
4.82

6.36
6.73
6.26
6.57
6.58
6.69
6.30
6.58
5.72
4.42

10.7
8.2
142.9
133.6
68.5
41.1
23.8
14.4
7.6
3.5*

*P - .06; all other p-values < .01
Note: A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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TABLE 2
INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF DECISION RULE AND
MINORITY-MAJORITY DISCREPANCY ON MINORITY INFLUENCE

Minority
Minority-Majority
Influence:^
Decision Rule
Discrepancy
Initial Final (Public) Difference F(1.94
Unanimous

Low
High

21,531
21,778

14,875
17,008

6,656
4,770

Non-unanimous

Low
High

21,863
20,829

19,921
15,535

1,942
5,294

Decision Rule

Discrepancy

3.58**

Initial Final (Private) Difference F(1.94)

Unanimous

Low
High

21,531
21,778

15,084
18,516

6,447
3,262

Non-unanimous

Low
High

21,863
20,829

20,256
15,410

1,607
5,419

6.02***

Repeated measures on initial versus final judgment.
**E - .06
***
. nc
E < .05
Note:

A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.

62

TABLE 3
DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES AS A FUNCTION OF DECISION RULE

Variable

Decision Rule

Consistent

Unanimous
Non-unanimous

Cooperative

Unanimous
Non-unanimous

Maj ority's Mean
Perception of
Minority Majority
8.29
7.45

4.12
4.85

Difference

F(1.94^

6.65
6.84

1.64
.61

8.67

6.75
6.33

-2.63
-1.48

7.15**

Repeated measures on the majority's perception of the minority vs.
their averaged perception of the other majority group members.
E < .01
Note: A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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TABLE 4
DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES AS A FUNCTION
OF MINORITY-MAJORITY DISCREPANCY

Variable
Liking for
this person

Similar to
rater in life
philosophy

MinorityMajority
Discrepancy

Majority's Mean
Perception of
Minority Majority

Difference

F(1.94>
4.67

Low

6.05

6.97

-.92

High

6.47

6.60

.13

Low

4.35

5.69

-1.34

High

4.94

5.31

-.37

,**

4.33

Repeated measures on the majority's perception of the minority vs.
their averaged perception of the other majority group members.
E < .05
Note: A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.

**
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TABLE 5
INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF DECISION RULE AND
MINORITY-MAJORITY DISCREPANCY ON PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES

Variable

Confidence

Decision
Rule

MinorityMajority
Discrepancy

Majority's Mean
Perception of
Minority Majority Difference— F(1.94)

Unanimous

Low
High

3.67
4.57

7.07
5.93

-3.40
-1.36

Nonunanimous

Low
High

5.02
4.67

6.36
6.31

-1.34
-1.64

Unanimous

Low
High

7.54
7.02

6.62
6.73

.92
.29

Nonunanimous

Low
High

6.80
7.46

6.95
6.20

-.15
1.26

4
4.50

**

11

Repeated measures on majority's perception of the minority vs. their
averaged perception of the other majority group members.
E
< .05
***
—

j> < .01

Note:

A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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TABLE 6
INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF DECISION RULE AND SEX OF
MINORITY ON PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES

Variable

Maj or ity's Mean
Perception of
Minority Majority

Decision
Rule

Sex of
Minority

Unanimous

Male
Female

8.32
8.24

6.41
6.22

1.91
2.02

Nonunanimous

Male
Female

8.05
7.35

6.03
6.50

2.02
.85

Unanimous

Male
Female

7.34

6.20

5.78
5.67

1.56
.53

Nonunanimous

Male
Female

6.24
6.04

5.60
5.97

.64
.07

Unanimous

Male
Female

6.10
3.88

6.90
6.49

-.80
-2.61

Nonunanimous

Male
Female

5.31
5.27

Difference

F(1.94^
4 *4 *

Strongwilled

Leader

Fairness

%

6.43
6.53

-

4.98

4.78**

5.21**

1.12

-1.26

Repeated measures on majority's perception of the minority vs. their
averaged perception of the other majority group members.
E < .05
Note:

A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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TABLE 7
DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES AS A
FUNCTION OF THE SEX OF THE MINORITY

Variable

Minority's
Sex

Maj ority's Mean
Perception of
Minority Majority

Difference

F(1.94")

Leader

Male
Female

6.79
6.12

5.68
5.82

1.11
.30

Active

Male
Female

8.14
7.49

6.56
6.67

1.58
.82

7.00

Central to
the discus
sion

Male
Female

7.55
6.87

6.31
6.39

1.24
.48

4.62

Confident

Male
Female

7.49
6.92

6.59
6.66

.90
.26

4.45

Reassess
opinion

Male
Female

5.90
3.98

4.69
4.36

1.21
-.38

12.58

Fair

Male
Female

5.70
4.58

6.67
6.51

-.97
1.93

7.14

Perceptive

Male
Female

6.29
5.20

6.49
6.31

-.20
1.11

5.21

*

15.64***
•kick

**

**

**

Repeated measures on perception of minority versus averaged
perceptions of other majority members.
R < *05
R < .01

Note:

A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.

67

TABLE 8
INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF SEX OF MAJORITY AND
SEX OF MINORITY ON PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES

Variable
Reassess
opinion

Admirable

Sex of
Majority

Sex of
Minority

Mean Perception of
Minority Majority

Difference

Male

Male
Female

5.50
3.78

4.60
3.59

.90
.19

Female

Male
Female

6.31
4.19

4.78
5.13

1.53
-.94

Male

Male
Female

7.54
6.57

6.43
6.35

1.11
. 22

Female

Male
Female

6.07
5.98

5.91
6.56

.16
.58

F(1.94)
3.86**

3.80

**

Repeated measures on majority's perception of the minority vs. their
averaged perception of the other majority group members.
E < •05
Note:

A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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APPENDIX A
INSTRUCTIONS
Please check your name on this list so that w e ’ll know who has
participated. Note the number next to your name... This is your
subj ect number and will be used to identify your data sheets. Make
sure you put this number on all of your materials, except for the case
history booklet. You have all volunteered to participate in this
study and as volunteers you may leave the experiment at any time. Of
course, we would prefer for you to stay, because if one person leaves,
none of the data from that group can be used.
This is a study of group processes--particularly the group
process of decision making. You will be asked to read a case history,
make an initial judgment and then, as jury members, adjourn to
deliberation rooms to discuss the case with fellow jurors. I'm going
to give each one of you a copy of the case history now. It is very
important, because of our paper shortage, that you not mark on these
case history booklets. We'll be re-using them several times.
(Pass out booklets.
questionnaire.)

As people being to finish, pass out 1st

I am now handing out a very brief questionnaire. Please write
your subject number where it says "Name.'' Do not write your name.
When you have finished the questionnaire, I'll pick it up.
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APPENDIX B
SMITH vs. BEAUCANNON INSURANCE CO.
(District Court, Boulder, Colorado)
Action was taken by Robert Smith against the Beaucannon
Insurance Company and Mr. Ralph Davis for recovery of damages for
personal injuries and expenses resulting from a fall down a stairs.
On the morning of April 7, 1976, Robert Smith, age 40, arrived
at the house of Ralph Davis in Boulder, Colorado in response to a call
placed the day before asking him to repair a washing machine in the
basement of the Davis' home. On arrival, he was greeted by Mrs.
Davis, who directed him to the door to the basement stairs. Since it
was an old house recently acquired by Mr. Davis, there was no light in
the stairway; consequently, the passage was very dark. On proceeding
down the stairs, Mr. Smith tripped on a basket of dirty laundry that
had been left by Mrs. Davis on the landing of the stairs. His
consequent fall caused the injuries complained of.
During the trial Mr. Smith offered evidence to prove that his
injuries included bruises about the face and head, a broken leg, and
severely torn cartilage in his knee, that as a result of these and
other injuries he received, he was unable to return to his employment
for ten weeks, that he thereafter worked only three or four hours per
day for eight to ten weeks more and was unable to resume full and
normal work activities for four or five months following the accident,
that his knee was not normal for a year in that it chronically swelled
and pained him, that his knee does not function normally, causing him
to walk with a slight limp, and has slipped out of joint on at least
two occasions, causing severe pain. In fact, it was shown that only a
week before trial his knee had dislocated while he was at work,
causing him two days of severe pain and loss of those two days' wages.
A doctor had stated that the cartilage would remain stretched and
weakened and that there would always be a possibility that his knee
would slip out of joint if sudden pressure was applied.
Mr. Smith also showed that, as the sole proprietor of and
workman in his repair shop, his only income before the accident was
about $225 per week, and that as proprietor he had insurance on his
hospital costs. This same insurance paid him an adequate amount in
loss of wages and will continue to reimburse him for future pecuniary
losses resulting from this accident.
It was also established that Mr. Smith's sole
enjoyment had been bowling and that he was a member
which his finesse had caused him to have popularity
Smith stated that the lingering pain in his leg and

recreation and
of a league within
and notice. Mr.
his uncertainty

70

about whether his knee would slip out of joint now prevents him from
bowling and will keep him from bowling ever again.
Mr. Smith is asking for 35 thousand dollars compensation (after
lawyer's fees), which he knows to be the full amount of personal
injury coverage (again after lawyer's fees) in Mr. Davis' insurance
policy. This amount, he contends, is to reimburse him for the past
and present pain and suffering and the worry and grief which he has
undergone as a result of this accident, and, as his lawyer stated,
"the irrevocable loss to him of an important aspect of his life, his
ability to participate in the game of bowling, or any other activity
which may cause his knee to painfully separate."
It was established during the course of the trial that Mr. Davis
and his insurance company are indeed responsible to Mr. Smith and
should indeed reimburse him for his losses. However, it is left to
you, the jury, to decide the amount of damages to be rewarded. The
judge turns to you and instructs you that "you will consider, in
reaching the amount of your verdict, how much you should award in
order to fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for the pain and
suffering, worry and grief, and humiliation that has been endured and
will hereafter be suffered. You will take all these matters into
consideration and, using your best judgment and experience in human
affairs, award such a sum that you consider should be awarded to
fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for the injuries received."
With that, you retire to your meeting room to decide how much
money should be awarded to Mr. Smith.
In summary:Mr. Smith's insurance company has paid
and will
continue to pay, should the need arise in the future, for Mr. Smith's
hospital bills and loss of wages resulting from this accident. Mr.
Smith has made his case that the injury to his knee has caused him
great pain and will prevent him from participating in active sports in
the future, although he is capable of full time employment. He
anticipates pain,
inconvenience, and a change in his life style in the
future.
It is up to you, the jury, to decide how much to give Mr.
Smith (after lawyer's fees) for the "pain and suffering, worry and
grief, and humiliation" that he has undergone and will continue to
undergo as a result of this accident.
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APPENDIX C
POST-CASE QUESTIONNAIRE
A.

Now that you have just read the case, we would like to have your
first impressions on how much should be given to Mr. Smith for
his pain and suffering. Remember that $35,000 is the maximum
amount that can be awarded.

$____________________________
Now that you have given your own opinion on what you feel Mr. Smith
should be given, we would like you to put down what you feel would be
the highest and lowest amounts that you could go to in order to reach
a group agreement.
B.

C.

The highest you would go for the sake of a group agreement:
$____________________________
The lowest you would go for the sake of a group agreement:
$____________________________
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APPENDIX D
PRE-DISCUSSION SESSION INSTRUCTIONS
[For unanimous decision]
You, as jury members, are to discuss this case and reach a
unanimous decision as to how much should be awarded to Mr. Smith. You
will have 1/2 hour to make your decision. Again, please do not mark
on the case history booklets. Let me give you an idea of where the
other jurors stand by telling you what each person here thinks Mr.
Smith should receive.
(Do so.)
Are there any questions?

[For non-unanimous decisions]
You, as jury members, are to discuss this case and decide how
much you each think should be awarded to Mr. Smith. You will have 1/2
hour to discuss the case and then I will return to get your individual
opinions. Again, please do not mark on the case history booklets.
Let me give you an idea of where the other jurors stand by telling you
what each person here thinks Mr. Smith should receive.
(Do so.)
Are there are any questions?
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APPENDIX E
MINORITY'S (CONFEDERATE'S) ARGUMENTS
I.

I feel sorry for this guy. He has suffered a leg injury which
is quite painful and which will be a source of aggravation and
inconvenience for him in the future. Besides that, he'll have
to change his life style--he won't be able to go out bowling
with the boys anymore. I think we need to compensate him for
these things and so I said I thought we should given him $4,000
and let him buy something really nice for himself.

II.

I think you have to consider the seriousness of a broken leg in
comparison to how badly he might have been injured. I'm not
saying a broken leg doesn't hurt or anything like that, but
after all, it could have been a lot worse. I could see giving
him $35,000 for a more serious injury.

III.

I think people have a tendency to give less consideration than
they might to how much compensation they are willing to award in
cases like this just because some insurance company is paying
for it. By supporting large claims you encourage other people
to file for large claims, which means that the insurance
companies will increase insurance premiums. Besides, just
because an insurance company is paying for this shouldn't cause
us to give away any more than we'd otherwise consider fair.

IV.

V.

VI.

We all have sympathy for thisguy and after all he deserves
it.
That's a painful injury and it's unfortunate that it happened.
But our sympathy has to be tempered by reality. Just because we
can award $35,000, that shouldn't interfere with an agreement on
what's fair.
We can't speculate about how much this is really worth to this
guy because nobody is going to go out and break his leg for
$35,000 or even $50,000. But once an accident has happened who
wouldn't want as much as they could get? The point is, this was
an accident and accidents do happen. I don't think that we can
necessarily say more money means more fair.
There's no way we can put a dollar figure on pain because
there's no way we can measure it. All we can really do is help
Mr. Smith find something to replace his bowling. I figured it
out that $4,000 is around $15 a week for the next five years,
which should be plenty for him to use to find himself a new
hobby.
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APPENDIX F
POST-DISCUSSION QUESTIONNAIRE BOOKLET
Name
Letter
Date
Time

Amount $

We would like for you to answer some questions about the group
discussion. As the format of some of the questions may not be
familiar to you, here is an example to illustrate how you should
indicate your answer.
How exciting is life at William and Mary?
Not at all exciting

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Very exciting

If you thought life at William and Mary was notat all exciting, you
would CIRCLE the 1. If you thought it was very exciting you would
circle the 9. (Note: You do not circle the words.) If you thought
life at William and Mary was moderately dull you would circle the 3 or
4, depending on how strongly you felt.
To make sure you understand this procedure,
numbers that corresponds with your opinion.
Do you have any questions?

please circle one

of the

75

1.

Now that you have discussed the case, we would like to have your
final impression on how much should be given to Mr. Smith for
his pain and suffering. In the interest of reaching a
compromise in the group you may have agreed to an amount greater
than or lesser than the amount you really think Mr. Smith should
receive. We would like to know your final personal opinion of
how much should be awarded.
$__________

2.

Assume that the maximum allowable compensation had been $50,000
instead of $35,000. How much should be given to Mr. Smith?
$__________

3.

Assume the original case situation ($35,000 maximum). However,
rather than being a jury member, you are the judge and you alone
decide the amount of damages to award. How much would you award
to M r . Smith?
$.

4.

How satisfied are you with the group''s final decision?
Not at all satisfied

5.

Very satisfied

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Very important

Considering the group as a whole (excluding yourself), how
similar are the other group members to you?
Not at all similar

8.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

How important is this topic to you?
Not at all important

7.

Very satisfied

How satisfied are you with the group discussion?
Not at all satisfied

6.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Very similar

Have you, or has any member of your family or close friend of
yours been involved in a court action to decide how much to
award someone who has been injured? If yes, briefly describe.
Continue on back, if necessary.

In order to understand the group process better, we would like
to have your perceptions of the other group members. BE SURE TO
INDICATE (BY USING THE LETTER ASSIGNED TO THAT PERSON) WHICH GROUP
MEMBER YOU ARE DESCRIBING.
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(Booklet included one for each group member.)

GROUP MEMBER
Very consistent

1.

Not at all consistent

12 3 45 6 7 8 9

2.

Not at all independent

12

3 45 6 7 8 9

Very independent

3.

Not at all active

12

3 45 6 7 8 9

Very active

4.

Not at all cooperative

12 3 45 6 7 8 9

Very cooperative

12 3 45 6 7 8 9

Very central to
the discussion

12 3 45 6 7 8 9

Very warm

12

3 45 6 7 8 9

Very strongwilled

12

3 45 6 7 8 9

Very perceptive

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

Not at all central to
the discussion
Not at all warm
Not at all strongwilled
Not at all perceptive
Not at all
a leader

12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Very much
a leader

10.

Not at all fair

12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Very fair

11.

Not at all confident

12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Very confident

12.

Not at all reasonable

12

Very reasonable

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

13.

Did not make me
reassess my opinions

12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

14.

Not at all likable

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Very likable

15.

Not at all admirable

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Very admirable

16.

Not at all similar to
me in life philosophy

12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Very similar to me
in life philosophy

17.

Not at all similar to
me on this specific
case

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Very similar to me
on this specific
case

Made me reassess
my opinions

77

VITA
Gail Susan Russ
Born at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, June 2, 1952.

Graduated

from New Hanover High School, Wilmington, North Carolina, June 1970,
B.A. with Honors in Psychology, University of North Carolina at
Wilmington, June 1976.

Entered the College of William and Mary in

September 1976 as a M.A. candidate and completed the coursework, but
not the thesis, in May 1978.

Attended the University of Rochester's

graduate program in social psychology, 1978-1979.
industries, 1979-1984.

Worked in private

Entered the Department of Management, Texas

A&M University, January 1985 and advanced to Ph.D. candidacy upon
completion of preliminary exams in July 1987.

